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1. Introduction 
The second half of the twentieth century has brought drastic changes in technology. 
These advances have changed the way marine resources are harvested or acquired 
The development of SCUBA made diving to depths of 50m unrestrained by the need 
for surface support, feasible. 1 This opened up the possibility of exploring below the 
surface of the sea. It also brought with it the possibility of salvaging wrecks and 
remains which had been hidden since antiquity.2 The year 1954 saw the first stem 
trawler the Fairtry converted from a decommissioned whaler. She was to set the 
standard for trawling efficiency and her design was soon replicated, replacing other 
types. 3 Nylon fibres made lines and nets lighter and more durable. 
Coupled with these changes in technology were those in the field of politics and the 
social sciences. The Empires finally fell. Their colonies are now virtually all 
independent and new expressions of community were given effect. Indigenous or 
"First people" are now given some form of credence and collective human rights 4. 
What do nylon nets and underwater welding torches have in common with island 
communities and aboriginal rights? Possibly little, save the fact that they could 
highlight relationships that give us cause to reassess our notions of acquisition of 
ownership. 
Science has been working frantically at finding methods of acquiring resources in the 
marine environment. Has Law kept pace? Are the notions of acquisition and 
ownership developed in ancient Rome and applied with little change into the modem 
era able to deal with current techniques of acquisition and harvesting? What 
alternatives are there? Is there any need to change at all? 
1 Loftas The Last Resource 1973 p.188 
2 op cit. 
3 Loftas p. 43 
4 1966 UN convention on the right to self determination 
2. 
To examine these questions it is necessary to asses varied notions of original . 
acquisition will be helpful will try to examine the notion of the original acquisition of 
ownership. The definition of occupation can be broken down into various elements. I 
will examine how these relate to various other alternatives and analogous situations. 
Historic shipwrecks have been likened to time capsules. Artefacts provide historians 
with details of the development of technology and culture. I will argue that the current 
law governing these resources is inadequate in that it does not provide sufficient 
protection. An examination of the legislative changes will be helpful in this regard. 
South Africa has seen some profound inroads into the once inviolate realm of private . 
property. The possibility that a community's rights could be respected is also given 
credence. 5 In this changing milieu it is perhaps a good opportunity to reconsider the 
acquisition of rights in shipwreck 
2. General Background 
What is needed is an appraisal of the concepts informing the jurisprudence of the 
acquisition of maritime property. The term possession is used rather glibly by the 
courts but it has many and varied manifestations Harris6 points out that "we cannot 
study possession in the abstract, for the word has no legal meaning apart from the 
context of"... particular rules" 7 A useful example of this would be the sale of a car. 
For an effective sale, a transfer should be effected. A seller who gives a buyer a set of 
keys to a car is said to have put the buyer in effective control. This is true even if the 
buyer has never even seen the car let alone been in any close physical proximity to the 
vehicle. The distinction in the types of possession needed for various purposes will be 
dealt with below under the heading of possession. Harris8 points out that the real 
question asked by the court when faced with an assertion of possession is to ask "Do 
the facts show that before or at the relevant time the plaintiff had entered into a 
5 Gutto SBO Property and Land Refonn Constitutional and Jurrisprudential Perspectives 1995 p.17 
6"The Concept of Possession in English Law" Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence p. 69 
7 op cit p. 70 
8 • op. Cit. 
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sufficiently close relationship with the chattel that he ought to be given the benefit of 
the particular rule against the particular defendant?"9 
This will be the foundation of this paper's analysis of the acquisition of wreck and the 
analogous areas of occupatio. This paper will relationship with the res idea must 
feature quite prominently. In establishing possession the question could be "has the 
plaintiff properly asserted his relationship?" and for an assertion that a thing is derelict 
or res nullius the question must be "has the previous owner properly terminated his or 
her relationship with the property?" Sonnekus makes use of the relationship with the 
res when discussing things in commercio as "Sake wat binne die regsverkeer val kan 
verder onderskei word ooreenkomstig die verhouding waarin dit tot die potensiele 
regsubjekte staan" 10. The relationship idea is echoed in Van der Vyver11 who looks 
for a factual relationship that offers a protected claim against others. 
A possible effect of establishing relationships is that the State has a curatorial 
relationship with all antiquities. This could be founded on a variety of bases, more 
fully discussed under their appropriate headings below. The actual judgements dealing 
with wreck have had elements of the relationship theme in them and much of the 
development in the law has been affected by these relationships. 
2.1 Occupatio v Salvage 
There is great potential for confusion to arise between salvage and occupation. This 
stems from the fact that they are different ways of acquiring rights in wreck. This has 
prompted Schoenbaum to write that "in starkly simple terms the conflict boils down to 
what rule fits the circumstances of the particular case. " 12 Occupatio is an original 
mode of acquisition. It is applied to a thing that is not owned and the first person to 
subject it to their control or "seize" it is the thing's new owner. 13 Salvage is a right 
particular to Maritime Law that allows a person who has rendered assistance to a ship 
9 op cit. 
10
" Besitsverkryging Oor 'n Skeepswrak As Res Nul/ius" TSAR 1989 4 720 p. 721 
11 THRHR 1970 231 p. 241 
12 Admiralty and Maritime Law 2nd ed. 1994 p. 336 
13 \ 
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( or cargo or freight) to be rewarded for their efforts and for any loss incurred to be 
compensated. 14 
Salvage is based on a set o.f factors which should all be present for a claim for an 
award to be effective
15
• The property salved must actually have been in danger. 
· Services must have been rendered, which services must not have arisen out of an 
underlying obligation. 16 In applying this to the facts in The Antipolis17 it is quite clear 
that there were services and that they were voluntary and contributed to the saving of 
the wreck18• The property salved should generally be maritime property. 19 In the case 
of a shipwreck this is hardly problematic since it is specifically provided for by the 
Merchant Shipping Act. 20 The question is really whether the property was in danger. 
the type of danger has to be qualified. It need not be the danger faced by metal 
through the mechanical and chemical corrosion of the sea but rather that danger which 
a res faces by being out of commercial interaction. A res, to have value must be in 
commercio so restoring a ship (or part of it) to commerce is to save it from the 
greatest peril possible. 21 This is not to say that the physical, danger is to be 
underestimated since a vessel in the surf zone is exposed to enormous corrosive 
action. 22 This action is, however, not immediate, and arguing immediate, physical 
danger might be rather tenuous. 23 . 
A further possible problem is that salvage is payable to a person who has rendered 
salvage services to a derelict wreck. Salvage is ordinarily paid by the owner of the 
wreck. A derelict wreck is, however, ownerless by definition. A wide reading of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act24 together with recourse to some of the older 
14 see generally Bamford The Law of Shipping and Carriage in South Africa Ch. 14 p. 75 
15
0p cit. 
16 op cit. p. 77 
17 1988 (3) SA 92 (C), 1990 (I) SA (751) 
18 Bamford op cit p.77 
19 The Wreck and salvage Bill incorporates the London Salvage Convention where the test is simply 
that it be in navigable waters. 
20 s 301 of Act of 1959 
21 compare the judgement of the
1
court in The Central America below 
22 The sister ship of the Romelia was recently decimated in an unseasonally ·strong storm only a few 
kilometres away 
23 105 of 1983 
24 see below under the Discussion of English Law 
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authorities mentioned below. If the wreck is modem and has an owner then the right 
that is acquired by the person bringing wreck to the surface or otherwise saving the 
property is usually a right of salvage 
2.2 TJ,e Antipolis 
2.2.1 The Antipolis Cape Provincial Division. 
The Antipolil-5 is one of the South African Court's more recent pronouncements on 
res nullius and the acquisition of resources. It is interesting to note the difference in 
approach between the a quo and Appellate Division decisions. I will first consider the 
judgement of The Hon. Burger J in the Cape Provincial Division and then the way that 
it was received by the Appeal court. 
The facts were briefly as follows: 26 Mills, the applicant agreed with Reck, the first 
respondent that they would recover condenser pipes from the wreck of The Antipolis. 
It was common cause that the wreck was in fact derelict. Mills had a licence to 
"salvage, to search and take possession of derelict ships or parts thereof'27 Mills also 
had a boat equipped for this purpose.28 Reck had the metal cutting apparatus suitable 
for the project. Both were professional divers. It must be noted that Reck had no 
salvage licence.29 Mills and Reck began working on the wreck in an attempt to cut 
condenser pipes free from the wreck. The divers were prevented from working by the 
onset of bad weather until the 14 of August. On this day Mills was driving past the 
site of the wreck and noticed the second respondent working on the wreck. Reck and 
the second respondent had also entered an agreement to work on the wreck with the 
purpose of taking out the condenser pipes. When Mills found the second respondent 
working on the wreck he was in fact able to claim "a prior right and eventually 
persuaded the second respondent to leave."30 But Reck and the second respondents 
25 Mills v Reck 1988 (3) 5:4 92 (CJ 
26 op cit. 





30 op. cit P. 93 
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.had managed to separate parts of the condenser from the wreck and Mills sued for 
their return. 
Justice Burger sums the matter up succinctly in his reply to counsel for the 
Respondents. After considering the degree of control required over the res, the court 
points out that the notion that separation of part of the wreck from its whole to acquire 
ownership was not well founded. The Court replied to the fact that respondent 
counsel had 
''strenuously contended that, until the propeller blade is actually separated the 
person who has been sawing at it daily for weeks without intermission, except to 
rest, has no rights whatsoever and at the final moment another person can sneak in 
and complete the separation of the blade and thus become its true owner .. .In my 
view the court would be failing in its duty if it did not protect the original salvor 
who has been working for days at separating ... parts from the shipwreck but allows 
the gate crasher to collect the valuable prize in the final moments"31 
After a discussion of the protection given to those in the process of acquiring rights in 
res nullius Burger J32 says" I am aware that this would recognise a right (not a right 
of ownership) to a person engaged in salvage. It seems that the rules of fairness and 
justice so demand." Perceptions of the judicial role have undergone considerable 
change. An open appeal to public policy is no longer looked down upon but rather 
welcomed. It is heartening to see that, while anchored in principles Burger J. 
Interprets these principles with a purposive approach in order that justice be done. It 
reflects a court concerned not with a cold, clinical dissection of our Law but rather one 
seeking to come to a workable solution to a vexed problem. 
Burger J goes on to say that: "The Court cannot countenance two people quarrelling 
or even fighting over the same object." This idea goes to the very heart of the court's 
protection of possession and the robust nature of the mandament van spolie there is a 
recognition that possession even if apparently tenuous must be maintained. Burger J 
31 op cit 95 G-1 
32 op cit 97 I 
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makes reference in his judgement to "quarrels and brawls"33 It is respectfully 
suggested that a possible source of this is the judgement of King Jin Greyling v Estate 
Pretorius. 34Here the court voices in strong terms the need to achieve order in the 
process of acquiring possession 
'ff it became an established practice for the Court to fail to enforce a spoliation 
order because it was made to appear that in the ultimate result the rightful owner of 
the property in dispute would be injured in his enjoyment of that property, we should 
very soon find that the slender paradise our toil has gained for us of an ordered 
community had been lost and the dreadful 'reign of chaos and old night" would be ~. -·~- r-~-.. - : ... ·-~ .• .,.~_f;i)°,..,...,. 
upon us. The modem Montagues and Capulets who resemble those famous and 
ancient families only in the single respect that they are equally prone to violence, 
would soon make our streets and thoroughfares hideous with their disputes, their 
fighting and their brawls - turbulence and civil commotion would soon replace the 
law of order and decency."35 
This impassioned plea reflects Burger J. 's concern. There is a need to see justice done 
so that an harmonious coexistence is protected. It seems to be in sharp discord with 
the Appellate Division judgement which has a clinical application of what is to be 
understood as a robust remedy. 
It is respectfully submitted that one of the strongest contentions put forward by Burger 
!- is the analogy between the acquisition of wreck and the acquisition of property by 
prescription. 36 The incisions of the welding torch are not unlike the days of possession 
which bring the possessor ever closer to ownership. A possessor in the process of 
acquiring possession must surely be protected from those who seek to interrupt his 
possession and thereby the process of acquisition. 
Burger J. provides a useful example. "Where A possesses the property of B, and A is 
in the process of acquiring ownership by prescription; C then interferes with A and by 
his interference would disrupt the process. This analogy is an attempt by the court to 
33 p. 98 E 
34 1947 (3) 584 (W) 
35 p. 59 (My underlining) 
36 op cit p. 9 
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""-
show how some relationships take time to cultivate. In the case of prescription it is as 
long as 30 years.
37 
Prescription is a good example of how an existing relationship is 
allowed to erode while a stronger bond is formed by another. This prompts the court 
to ask who could be said to have the stronger relationship after the passage of time. 
This analogy corresponds closely to the decision of the English Probate court in The 
Tubantia38 discussed below. 
The real strength of the analogy must lie in the fact that it is a recognition that 
acquisition is a process. Some processes are quicker than others. The slower the 
process the greater the likelihood that interlopers will seek to disrupt it. The legal 
system that does not find an efficient way of dealing with the problem invites the civil 
commotion warned of in Grey ling v Estate Pretorius. 39 
2.2.2 The Decision Of The AD In The Antipolis 40 
This judgement is, with respect, disappointing. It seems that the judgement is founded 
very heavily on an interpretation of the pleadings as result of which the Appellate 
Division missed an opportunity to resolve an important lacuna in both Maritime and 
Property law. 
The pleadings prayed for an order for the restoration of the condensers ante omnia 
pending the final determination of the ownership of the condensers in an action which 
was to be Iaunched. 41 The court chose to view this in the narrowest possible sense. 
Joubert JA in his judgement remarks that: 
'Nader beskou. is dit duidelik dat bede lA gebaseer is op die mandament van spolie 
as regsmiddel met die stelreel spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est as grondslag, nl. 
die persoon (spoliatus) wie se besit wederegtelik ontneem is, moet eers in sy vorige 
37 Vd Mern::e.Law ofThings par 154 
38 {i<J24} P. 78 . I 
~
9 1947 (3) 5:4 584 (JV) , 
~1990{1)-751-(A)-- --- -- 1 
41 p. 755 in paragraph lA of the pleadings. 
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toestannd herstel word deur die spoliator voordat daar op die meriete van die saak 
ingegaan word."42 
The court then chooses to define the circumstances in which a mandament van spolie 
might be awarded very narrowly. The circumstances provided by the court are far 
more clinical and limited than those in which the court in Greyling v Estate Pretorius43 
were prepared to allow for relief The requirements for a mandament as set out by 
Lucas AJ. in Scoop Industries v Langlaagte Estate and G.M Company Ltd (In vol 
liq.) 44 Here the court provided that two simple questions should be asked "Was the 
applicant in possession?" and "Was this possession disturbed?" 
The court then seeks to rearrange the pleadings in an attempt to bring it within the 
realm of the mandament van spolie. Joubert JA is not satisfied with the phrasing of 
the pleadings as they are set out. He suggests that the phrase "pending the final 
determination of an action to be instituted by the applicant against the first and second 
respondents for a declaratory order as to ownership and other relief." is misplaced and 
should be dealt with elsewhere in the pleadings. It is respectfully suggested that the 
phrasing used was chosen carefully after a consideration of the strengths of Mills' 
position. It is possible that Mills' had phrased his pleadings in a way that would not 
resemble a prayer for a mandament van spolie. The mandament would not consider 
surrounding merits of the case. It would instead would pose two simple questions: 
Was there peaceful possession? And Was it disturbed? Due to the relative difficulty in 
proving possession, phrasing the relief sought as a mandament might have been 
avoided. 
An appropriate question at this stage would be whether the approach of the ·courts 
furthers the principle which the law seeks to protect. A purposive approach would 
have asked "Has this decision furthered the problems which the law seeks to 
alleviate?" It has been pointed out that the mandament aims to stop self help. 
42 op. cit p. 755 
43 op cit. 
44 1948 l &4 91 (W) 
It is respectfully submitted that their order was not to be temporary. The granting of a 
spoliation order would automatically become a final order. All the elements of 
occupatio had been completed save for possession so the first person to be in legally 
recognised possession could be considered to be the owner. 
Another factor not considered by the court is the precise nature of the possession 
which should be exercised. This is canvassed more fully below in the discussion of 
possess10n. 
Joubert JA in his discussion of res nullius mentions Grotius 2.1.52. and 2.32.3 for 
authority that a thing can be ownerless and acquired through occupatio. There is a 
paragraph dealing specifically with ships that have run aground as The Antipolis had. 
2.4.36. provides that "stranded goods" which includes: 
" ... things which owing to high tide or shipwreck are found in the sea and fished out 
of it. .. were held to be the Count's private property, including even the wreckage 
of ships which have run aground. "45 
The only stronger claim was that of the original owner. Grotius' owner had one year 
and six weeks within which he could come to redeem his property against payment of 
Salvage charges. "After the above mentioned time has elapsed the count is entitled to 
h ,,46 t e property ... 
Joubert JA feels that the application of the salvage procedures described above has 
been abrogated by disuse since the more recent writers had not made mention of its 
provisions. 47 The matter had in fact come before South African Courts in Johnston & 
Irvin v Mayston. 48 The matter was raised but not fully resolved. The court was not 
faced with the issue directly. In Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage 
Syndicate, Ltd. 49 Chief Justice De Villiers held it to be trite Law that the Crown has a 
45 2.4.36 
46 op cit. 
47 p. 75!@#$% 
48 1908 29 NLR 696 p. 699 
49 1906 SC 169, 172 
11 
prior claim to abandoned shipwreck over the finder. The matter was not developed 
further in that judgement since it was found that there had not been a proper 
abandonment since rights in the wreck had passed to the vessel's underwriters by 
subrogation. so There had also been extensive reliance on the Roman Dutch Salvage 
procedures by the Department of Customs and Excise. This extended application 
involved barring the true owner of salved property from recovering it a year and six 
weeks after it had been salved and left in the care of the Customs and excise 
authorities. 51 More recently Bamford52 in possibly one of the inore authoritative 
statements of the current law concerning shipping in South Africa was comfortable 
saying that the finder is entitled to possession of the goods except as against the State 
and the true owner. 
The approach of Joubert JA. is not unusual and the phenomenon has been well 
documented by Visser. 53 What has been pointed to is a process whereby a principle of 
the Common Law with English Law roots or leanings would be removed by recourse 
to the old authorities. Joubert JA. it is respectfully submitted was under even greater 
pressure since he had to contend with a statute which would have introduced English 
Law directly. 54 
The denial of rights of the State does not reconcile the fact that the Merchant Shipping 
Act makes specific mention of it. This provision was relied on by the Department for 
Customs and Excise in their claims for wreck in terms of the Merchant Shipping Act. 
S 301 provides that a reasonable claim for salvage is to be paid by the Secretary for 
Customs and Excise for saving wreck. Statutes generally are interpreted so as to 
disturb the common law as little as possible. The MSA is surely no exception. 
That the courts have discounted the possibility of the Law of Salvage being applicable 
is not surprising. Were the matter to be seen as one of salvage, there is a very real 
50 op cit p. 171 
51 Hanns L "A question of Abandonment" THRHR 1964 138 
52 The Law of Shipping and Carriage in South Africa 1983 p 85 
53 "Daedalus in the Supreme Court" 1986 THRHR 
54 AJRA discussed below 
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possibility that it would fall outside the ambit of Roman Dutch Law and would more 
appropriately be dealt with by English Law. 
2.2.3 Mandament v Interdict 
It is respectfully contended that here again the court put too much emphasis on the 
textual interpretation of the pleadings without considering how the forms of relief 
relate to each other. The relief sought need not have been adjusted to a synthetic 
matching of a particular remedy. Allowing for the courts interpretation should the 
relief have been allowed? 
The mandament is available where a person is deprived of the whole or part of his 
possession or where there has been deprivation of possession by a co-possessor. The 
interdict is available where possession is disturbed or threatened. Both of these are not 
concerned with the protection of rights but rather with the safeguarding an existing 
state of affairs. Badenhorst & Coetser55 point out that the mandament is granted ante 
omnia and no enquiry into existing rights is to take place. The fact that an unlawful 
possessor could bring a mandament further supports this. This is not readily reconciled 
with the decision in Mathee v Schietekat. 56 Here the court found that the possessor in 
good faith has a right to the thing. The juristic conundrum of whether the factual state 
of possession gives rise to a right or a possessor has a right to the protection of an 
existing physical state need not concern us. 
The Appellate division is dismissive of the possibility of founding a temporary interdict. 
Assuming that the reordering of the pleadings was warranted, the Court feels that a 
temporary interdict is not available. 57 The court does not make it clear why the 
elements for a temporary interdict have not been met. In Eriksen Motors Ltd. v 
Protea Motors58 the Appellate Division spelled out the requirements for this relief 
55 "Berging van Skeepswrakke Enkele Aspekte." TSAR 1989 
56 1959 (1) £4 344 (C) cited by Badenhorst & Coetser op cit. 
51 The Antipolis 1990 (l) SA 751 (A) 759 
58 1973 (3) £4 685 (A) 691 B-D 
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The court provides that there should be "a right which though prima facie established, 
is. open to some doubt." There should be a well grounded apprehension of irreparable 
injury as well as the absence of an ordinary remedy. 59 The right can be open to doubt. 
It is respectfully submitted that Joubert JA. need not have convinced himself of the 
nature of the right but rather should have had the same concerns of civil disorder that 
Burger J sought to ~ddress. 
Selikowitz f 0 sums up the enquiry very well. "The right which applicant in fact 
asserts must be assessed in all the circumstances and in the light of the matrix of facts 
against which the applicant seeks to exercise the right." The court could have analysed 
the whole res gestae from the time of the conclusion of the agreement between Mills 
and Reck until the time the parties were before the court and then determined whether 
or not there was a prima facie right. 
2.3 Historic Shipwreck 
The efforts of salvage divers are not focused solely on modern wrecks. Where the 
object of the salvers search on a modern wreck might be for scrap metal or 
navigational instruments to be sold on the second hand market, The target of the 
search of a salvor on an historical wreck is very different. The property that they seek 
to recover might be ordinary objects that acquire their value by virtue of the antiquity 
of the wreck and its contents. Herein lies the problem. Some of these objects are 
obviously of significant academic or archaeological interest. 
Is it fair to say that historical wreck taken by occupatio automatically becomes the 
property of the finder? This is an area of the law which has seen extensive abrogation 
of the common law in order to protect the cultural heritage of South Africa. The idea 
that the salver should receive none of the specie recovered but only a payment for his 
services is canvassed below under the discussion of res nullius. 
59 op cit. 
60 Soundprop 1239 CC v Minister of Safety and Security [ 1996] 3 A/1.s:4 698, 701 
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The protection of historic wrecks is provided for by the National Monuments Act.61 
The Act allows for a wreck to be declared a national monument. 62 The wreck should 
be 50 years or older or there should be a reasonable suspicion of the required age. 
How does the declaration of a wreck as a national monument affect ocupatio? The 
most important element is that it would require any person attempting to work on or 
disturb the wreck to have a permit for this purpose. 63 
Once any artefacts are recovered they are placed in the custody of a museum. 64 The 
museum, the salver and the NMC decide on how they are to be distributed. Once an 
artefact is acquired by the salver it could hardly be said that a full right of ownership is 
established since the salver is heavily restricted in how he may deal with it. He may 
not "destroy, damage, alter or export from the Republic"65 any of the wreck which he 
has acquired in the procedure outlined above. The Act in fact states that no right of 
ownership is conferred than that outlined in the permit. This alienation of the property 
may only take place with the consent of the NMC. This is a consent which would 
probably not readily be given. 
Deacon66describes the conditions that attach to the permits. The salver is to be 
personally liable for all salvage operations and those working under him. The salver 
would be given exclusive rights to work on the wreck for 3 years. The salver had to 
offer some proof of identity and age of the wreck. 67 Permits to work on wrecks dating 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth century were apparently not given out readily. 
Deacon68 notes that "exceptional circumstances" would be required. These conditions 
were to become stricter following an episode in 1989 where the Port Captain of Cape 
Town placed a moratorium on all historical wreck being brought into Cape Town from 
Table Bay. This was following a period of unusually good diving conditions wh_en 
61 28 of 1969 
62 s IOA (1) 
63 s 12 (2C)(a) 
64 s 12 (2C)(t) 
65 s 12 (2B)(d) 
66 "Protection of Historic Shipwreck through the National Monuments Act p. 3 
67 op cit. 
68 op cit. 
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several wrecks were exposed in Table Bay. A series of what Deacon tactfully refers to 
as "disputes"69 broke out and the moratorium was imposed. There was also a concern 
that Department of Manpower regulations were being flouted to fully exploit the 
favourable conditions. There was a lot of dissatisfaction with the moratorium and after 
consulting with salvers and others the NMC agreed to allow the lifting of the 
moratorium and the establishment of a system of inspectors chosen not from other 
divers but rather from a recognised museum or university.70 
3. Historical Development Of Occupatio 
The history of shipwrecks must surely be as old as shipping itself It would stand. to 
reason that if there are ships being sailed that there are also ships and cargoes lost. 
Stranding or grounding might leave ships in the shallows easily accessible from the 
shore. Those vessels which sank in shallows would not be beyond reach since the 
notion of specialist divers is mentioned as far back as Ancient Babylon. 71 
3.1 Roman Law 
The Roman law recognised occupatio and its basic formula was to survive down the 
ages relatively intact. 
The Digest contains the broad statement that 
'ff we know that the owner regards a thing as abandoned we can acquire it . . . It no 
longer belongs to the abandonner but will another's only when it comes into 
possession" 72 
69 op cit p. 5 
10 op cit. 
71 The Babylonian Talmud has a cryptic parable which makes reference to a diver retrieving a lost 
gem in Baba Bathra 74A 
72 D 41 7 2 1 
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Things jettisoned from a ship are not to be automatically deemed to have been 
abandoned and could not be taken by usucapion. 13 
"Occupo" implies the action of seizing possession or control74 Watkins points out that 
Gaius does not deal with occupatio as a noun but rather as a verb.75 Watkins shows 
that the development of the original acquisition of wild animals was developed to take 
into account the changing economic significance of wild animals. 76 
At the outset, that image of wild animals which we might ascribe to ancient Rome 
should perhaps be cast aside. It is not the traditional notion of wild animals in vast 
woodlands hunted occasionally for sport or as a nutritional supplement of the lower 
classes. The pastio villatica was an enormous speciality food production centre where 
exotic animals were raised to be sold at the markets to be part of the many and varied 
courses at the Roman banquet. 
The homesteads which specialised in this area had moved away from other forms of 
farming such as wine or olive oil production and focused instead on this specialised 
niche market77 This prompted Watkins to comment that a villa might have "never seen 
hay in the in the loft, a vintage in the wine cellar nor corn in the granary" instead 
aviaries for the fattening of diverse types of birds were created as well as fish ponds for 
aquaculture not to mention cages and enclosures for the keeping of boars, hairs, deer 
and even snails. 
This "innovation in the realm of agricultural practice"78was to have its impact on the 
law of occupatio. An important innovation was the recognition that the establishment 
of a relationship with a res would affect the legal nature of that res. It is the ability of 
73 D 4177 
74 Cassels Latin Dictionary 
75 Watkin "Occupatio and the Pastio Villatica" of Legal History 1991 
76 op. cit. 
77 Watkins cites Varno in De Re Rustica III 2.6 
78 op cit. 
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the Roman Jurists to mould their law effectively to deal with changes in technology 
and economics which could provide helpful guidance to us in South Africa 
3.2 Medieval Law 
The Rhodian Sea Law was a codification of maritime custom of the Mediterranean. It 
is pointed out that it is considered the "fountain of maritime jurisprudence"79The Sea 
Law maintained the Roman Notion that ownership of property which is thrown 
overboard to save a ship in peril would not be lost. Instead of acquiring ownership of 
the property the finder of such property was entitled to an ad valorem award. 80 
The full extent of the award was dependant on a variety of factors. Where the ship 
was for example lost on the high seas the value of the award to the salver would be 
one fifth of the value of the property. 81 Salvage of shipwrecked property inshore would 
also be compensated. Interestingly this was linked to the depth in which the wreck 
was to be found. If the wreck lay in 15 Fathoms the salver was entitled to half the 
value of the goods. That recovered from eight fathoms earned one third of the value 
while that on the or within one cubit from it earned one tenth. 82 
It is interesting to note the durability of the shipowners or merchants ownership in their 
property. The original owner would have an action for the return of his property 
subject to the salvage award. These awards were to reward the salver for his efforts 
and ingenuity which ensured the safe return of the property. The rational for the 
awards and more particularly for awards to the crew for assisting the vessel or 
passengers in distress, which Melikan proposes is that " [t]he difference between the 
mariner and the pirate in the period was often only a matter of resisting 
temptation"83Melikan also points out that the Sea Law was a considerable 
79 Melikan "Shippers Salvors & Sovereigns Competing Interests in the Medieval law of shipwreck" 
Journal ofLegal History 1991 
80 par. 38 of The Rhodian Sea Law 
81 Melikan op cit. 
82 par 4 7 of The Rhodian Sea Law 
83Melikan p. 105 
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improvement on the Corpus Juris Civilis84She feels that the Roman Law had more an 
academic interest in shipwreck as an example of how ownership endures through the 
absence of possession. The Sea Law on the other hand grew up out of commercial 
practice and hence was far more practical. It dealt with actual awards and the need for 
the safe carriage of cargoes. Melikan suggests that this added security encouraged 
commercial activity. This seems probable since the shipper who knows his goods 
would be returned if lost ( even if only against the payment of a salvage award) is 
guaranteed the safe carriage of the cargo. 
3.3 The Dutch Jurists 
In order properly to evaluate the classification of marine resources as res-nullius it is 
necessary to enquire into the basis of the classification.. Grotius distinguishes between 
different areas, land and river as opposed to the sea. He goes on to say that this 
classification is both " .. expedient and necessary". Why should it be so? 
'for everyone admits that if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in the 
river, the forest is easily exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but such a 
contingency is impossible in the case of the sea. "85 
the acquisition of maritime property was discussed in the digest at 41.1.5.1 The 
position laid out is that ownership in a res nullius does not pass until final capture. 
The passage actually deals with game. There has been substantial abrogation of the 
common law by statute in this area. 86 
Grotius in Mare Liberum explores the notion of the acquisition of Marine resources at 
length. Grotius was prepared to acknowledge that there was a possibility that very 
extensive rights could be established without actual occupatio 
84 op. cit. 
85 The Freedom of the Seas p. 57 
86 see below for a discussion of the Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 
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Because of the relative obscurity of the text and the authority which Grotius enjoys in 
South African law the full text of the extract is given: 
'Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing namely 
that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless there shall be no prejudice if any 
one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, 
and so establish a private preserve ... " 
Not all res nullii were to be treated equally, however, the passage from Grotius 
outlined below 
'ff anyone had prevented Lucullus or Apollinaris from fishing in private fish ponds 
which they had made by enclosing a small portion of the sea, according to Paulus 
they would have the right of bringing an injunction (interdictum), not merely an 
action for damages based on private ownership. "87 
'1ndeed if I have staked off an enclosure in an inlet of the sea, just as in a branch of 
a river, and have fished there, especially if by doing so continuously for many years 
I shall have given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall 
certainly prevent anyone else from enjoying the same rights. l gather from 
Marcianus that this case is identical to ownership of a lake and is true as long as 
occupation lasts. . "88 
This passage points to a fascinating irony. Grotius was prepared to accept that some 
things although ostensibly not capable of private ownership could in fact be owned if a 
close personal relationship had been fonned. This implies that the greatest possible 
control, of which the property is capable has been brought to bear on it. The irony 
becomes apparent on reading the judgement of Joubert who finds that the court a quo 
was out of keeping with Roman Dutch Law. It is respectfully submitted that possibly 
the father of Roman Dutch Law would have granted Mills the interdictum which he 
sought! 
87 De Mare liberurn 
88 op cit · 
20 
The fact that the thing should be in commercium and unowned must also be further 
considered. Could an answer to the problems be found in an assessment of what is to 
be considered unowned or in commercium. If a community prepares a sacred object 
for a ritual purpose would that thing become a res nullius if it is lost? It could be that 
the community as joint owners do not conceive of ownership ever being relinquished. 
These concerns are amplified under the discussion of res nullius 
V oet has a disturbingly arbitrary distinction. 89 Hunting and fishing are permitted in a 
fenced wood or standing water but forbidden in a vivarium (a stocked fenced wood) or 
a fish pond. Here there is little notice served on the potential possessor. In surveying 
a body of still water he or she could not be expected to know the exact origins of the 
biota within. Surely the notice that was available was the local knowledge of which 
the intrepid angler would be presumed to be possessed. How much more so for The 
Antipolis where there had been a partnership agreement.. The defendant had been 
aware of the plaintiffs attempts to secure control over the res he had the notice which 
would have satisfied the Grotian approach. 
This approach must also be viewed in the light of the significance attached to the 
economic role of the res: Was the person actively involved in speciality food 
production or did they chance to have these things on their land. In the case of salvage 
the analogy is stronger the large commercial salvage undertakings closely resemble the 
Roman pastio villatica. They too are faced with a law which was not intended to deal 
with the change in economic significance from occasional windfall to a purposeful 




3.4 Early South African Law 
3.4.1 Van Breda v,Jacobs 1921 AD 330 
Do free swimming fish belong to the first person to acquire control (i.e. to net and 
land it?) Not necessarily Our courts have had cause to examine this problem in the 
past. The general rule will apply unless modified by custom. The case is the locus 
classicus for the proposition that custom could be a source of law. This case gives a 
demonstration of how communities develop their own system for dealing with rights in 
marine resources and the possibility that a relationship with the res would be 
recognised. Effectively the court permitted an abrogation of the common law rules of 
acquisitive ownership by the customary rules that were current at the time. 
The plaintiff was a trek/ beach seine fisherman in False Bay. His crew had sighted a 
shoal of fish and set off in pursuit. Trek net fishing involves encircling a shoal of fish 
with a net and slowly pulling the shoal onto the beach. The defendant intercepted the 
shoal and was able to land it. The plaintiff sought the value of the catch totalling 32£ 
4s. The amount was awarded to the plaintiff because of the custom of the area. The 
matter could have been resolved by applying Harris's test of who was in a closer 
relationship to the resource. The court in applying custom had actually applied 
commercial reality it would be unworkable if a person in the process of acquiring 
ownership was not afforded some form of protection from whoever tried to intercept 
them. This act bears many similarities to The Hypatia below. Once the process of 
acquisition is begun the law will offer protection. 
Van Breda's case raises the further possibility that relationships might be 
geographically localised. Harris' test9() would be reformulated as "Who would be 
considered to be in a closer relationship with the res in the area of the parties to the 
litigation?" Here the result would be the same since the relationship test is modified to 
give effect to localised relationships. 
90 op cit. p. 70 
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3.4.2 Underwater Construction And Salvage v Bell 1968 (4) SA 190 (C) 
This is the forerunner to The Antipolis discussed above and it would be interesting to 
contrast the views taken by the court in the later case and applied to the facts of Bell. 
The plaintiff and defendant divers were working on the wreck of The Hypatia off 
Robben Island in an attempt to salvage scrap from the derelict hulk. Both parties had 
ostensibly intended to blast the propellers loose from the vessel. The plaintiff was first 
to succeed in this and managed to load two of the four propellers onto the support 
vessel to be taken to Cape Town Docks. Two propellers were therefore left behind. 
The judgement proceeds to say that "They fixed a marker in the form of a floating 
rope to a shaft next to which the remaining two blades were lyin~"91 The defendant 
went two days later and removed the rope and took the two propellers. Banks J found 
for the plaintiffs saying that 
'There was a seizure - a taking into possession as soon as they were forced apart 
from the wreck and this having been done with the intention of acquiring 
ownership, rendered plaintiff owner thereof." 
The idea that leaving it on the sea bed lost ownership was rejected by Banks J. What 
the plaintiff divers had done was subject the res to as much control as was possible at 
the time. Little more could be asked of them 
3.4.3 First Attempts At Protecting His!orical Wreck 
The history of the need to protect historical wreck is clearly linked to the origins of the 
threats against its security. Deacon92 points out that the need for protection is closely 
linked to the development of "safe and affordable" diving equipment for what she 
91 p. 191 B (my underlining) 
92 Protection of Historical Shipwrecks through the National Monuments Act 
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terms· the "man on the beach". 93 The first protection was to be the amendment of the 
National M~numents Act.94(NMA). · This act was to provide for the repeal of earlier 
attempts at the protection of antiquities.95 The NMA established the National 
monuments council (NMC). The Council was granted fairly wide powers for the 
protection of South Africa's cultural heritage. The initial concern is described by 
Deacon. 96 Artefacts had been taken off several historical shipwrecks and sold at public 
auction in 1972. Valuable archaeological information was lost forever. As a response 
to this a permit system was introduced to allow for the regulation of the removal of 
artefacts or the disturbance of a wreck site. 
4. Occupatio Defined 
To assess the definition and apply it to Maritime property, Carey Miller's definition is a 
good place to start. 
O,rnership is acquired by taking possession of a corporeal thing, not the subject of 
an existing right of ownership, with the intention of becoming owner. 97 
The element of possession is clearly the first step. Its importance might, however have 
been exaggerated. This has prompted writers to warn that 
'tlit is belangrik om daarop te let dat eiendoms reg in geeneen van hierdie gevalle 
uit blote besit ontstaan nie"98 
The thing must obviously be intra commercium and a res nullius. These are 
considered more fully below but these concepts are very helpful in assessing who can 
in fact acquire ownership. 
93 op cit p .. 2 
94 28 of 1969 
95 Such as the Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiquities Act 4 of 1934 
96 op cit p 3 
97 1987 
98 CG Van der Merwe "Die Aard van Besit en die animus Element daarvan" THRHR 1978 
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Implicit in possession is an element of good faith. An analysis of the facts of both The 
Antipolis and Van Breda reflects a strong possibility that seizure took place in bad 
faith. The knowledge of the activities of Mills which Reck had gained during the 
subsistence of their partnership should be sufficient for Reck to realise that there had 
been established some prior relationship with the res. 
4.1 Possession Of An Unowned Thing 
4.1.1 Possession 
The acquisition is premised on the fact that the thing is indeed unowned. Possession of 
an owned thing is clearly of little value as is an absence of any form of possession. 
Merely seeing the res or simply remarking on its presence should have little effect in 
I 99 aw. 
What is the precise content to be give to this possession. Possession consists of two 
elements the physical and the mental element ( corpus and animus). The baby and the 
wreck diver have much in common where possession is concerned. The infans is used 
as an example of how the degree of control over the res should be highly subjective. 
Since a baby is only capable of a limited mental component so the diver is an example 
of limited control of the physical element. Harris100 writes that 
'The plaintiff's degree of physical control should not be seen in isolation, but in 
relation to the greatest degree of physical control which it is possible for the 
particular plaintiff to exercise over a particular chattel. Thus the limited physical 
control of a child or an epileptic may be properly recognised, as is the limited 
control over a very large chattel or a wreck at the bottom of the sea." 
In making this analysis Harris specifically refers to The Tubantia101 
99 Silberberg and Schoeman "The Law of Property" p.115 
100 op cit p. 74 
IOI Op cit. 
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4. 1. 1.1 Corpus 
The difference in corpus in The Antipolis and The Hypatia is perhaps the courts 
recognition of this factor in the latter case. What is the nature of the physical control 
to be exercised? Why qid the court reject the attempts by Mills to mark out the site of 
his work? Joubert JA doubted that there was a buoy tied to the wreck but opines that 
even if one were tied on it would still not amount to the required physical control. 102 
Here it must respectfully be asked why the learned judge chooses to counter so 
established a principle as the marking oflagan. 
It is respectfully submitted that the deficiencies of the courts reasoning will become 
apparent when The cases of The Hypatia and The Antipolis are contrasted. In the 
former the propellers were cut free but could not really be said to be under the 
plaintiffs direct control. What control was he exercising over them while they lay on 
the sea bed. Surely the real control is achieved once they are loaded onto the dive 
support vessel. The same is argued for The Antipolis what less control did the plaintiff 
exercise here. The question becomes : 
"How do I exercise control over the condenser but by the tying of the buoy?" It is 
important to point out the exact location and setting of the wreck. She lies with her 
bow in the tidal zone and her stem very much in the surf zone. The swell in that area 
can become enormous.(At the time of writing a warning to navigators had been issued 
advising of 1 Om seas.) What more physical control can be achieved over a hulk or 
parts thereof than the humble float line. The float line is given recognition in other 
areas of law as a means of indicating possession. The Merchant Shipping Act still 
speaks of "lagan". 103 The MSA still allows property rights in lagan to be maintained. 
All that lagan is, is simply objects with float lines attached. Bamford104 describes 
lagan thus 
102 op cit p. 759 E 
ioJs2(1) 
104 op cit p. 74 
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'tagan (vel potius ligan) is when the goods which are so cast into the sea, and 
afterwards the ship perished, and such goods cast are so heavy that they sink to the 
bottom and the mariners to the intent to have them again tie to them a cork, or a 
buoy or such other thing that will not sink so that they may have them again" 
To argue that complete separation is required to establish possession does not take 
account of the complexities of the activity. The plaintiff clearly eschewed blasting the 
condenser clear because a condenser consists of an intricate mass of piping and a blast 
coupled with water in the piping would have been ill advised. 
Sonnekus105 feels that Mills had no intention of acquiring the whole wreck nor had he 
managed to separate any part of it. The degree of control should be that which would 
publicise one's control to others. On the facts, however, the defendant was an ex 
partner and had full knowledge of the attempt at acquisition. Again assuming that 
there was no such knowledge how is one to achieve this publicity element and to 
whom should the notice be addressed? The Antipolis lies in roughly 12m of water and 
extends to the surface. How is publicity to be effected? Should the world at large have 
knowledge or only other salvage licence holders. 
The degree of control of a ship has been considered by the courts. In Cape Tex 
Engineering works v S.A.B. Lines106 the court found that where there had been better 
practical means of effecting control of a ship than simply placing two servants of Cape 
Tex on board. Corbett J. as he then was found that the existing control of the master 
and crew had not been disturbed to a sufficient degree. 107 In applying this to The 
Antipolis it is clear that the greatest degree of control is a highly subjective enquiry. 
There are different types of control necessary to assert possession of a ship fully 
fuelled and crewed and the stripped hulk of one lying in the surf zone. 
105 "Besits verkryging oor n Skeepswrak as res nu/lius" TSAR 1989 1 720 
106 1968 (2) S4 528 (C) 
107 see generally 533 D 
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4.1.1.2 Animus 
As a general proposition the mental state must be animus domini. 108 This is possessing 
with intention of becoming owner. This part of the definition will not be very 
problematic in cases of wreck salvage since it is implicit in commercial salvage work 
will be performed with the intention of becoming owner to sell the property at a profit. 
What is the case however if the salver is aware of a potential owner even after a 
protracted period of time. This was the case in The Central America109 where salvers 
had made contact with the underwriters, who had acquired ownership in the wreck by 
subrogation. Then the animus will surely not be animus domini but a weaker form. 
This would probably be the animus ex re commodum acquirendi this is the intention of 
holding to acquire some benefit for oneself 110 It is submitted that were the facts of the 
Central America to present themselves to a South African court the lack of the proper 
mental state would affect the salver's rights in the wreck. The other possible animus 
element is that of being in control of the property and intending to remain in control. 
Silberberg and Schoeman 111 refer to this as the animus possidendi. This is also too 
weak to facilitate acquisition but also allows one to remain in control through servants 
and agents more effectively. The only possible practical application of this to a wreck 
salvage situation is the fact that a plaintiff salvage company would be acting through its 
agents and therefore might rely on this mental element. 
The two latter mental state should entitle the holder to a mandament van Spolie but 
not to become owners by occupatio. The weaker mental relationship required could 
have been noted by the court before the manipulation of the pleadings commenced. 
What Mills might have been trying to plead was a mental state far stronger than one 
which entitled him to a mere temporary right of possession. What he could have been 
asserting was a mental state which is protected by an interdict against trespass. (Which 
it is respectfully submitted is not an English aberration in the law but a remedy Grotius 
himself would allow.)112 
108 CG Van der Merwe THRHR 1978 
109 see the discussion of the case below under the heading of US law 
110 Silberberg & Schoeman p. 122 citing V Blerk JA in Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 730 (A) p. 739 
111 Op cit. 
112 see below under the discussion of The Roman Dutch Law 
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4.1.2 Res Nullius 
The requirement that a thing be unowned is an essential part of occupatio. The 
question of when something is unowned is a vexed one since it is possibly against 
human nature to simply walk away from our property. The courts have been very 
reluctant to infer abandonment in most cases. 113 The intention to abandon must be very 
clearly shown. In The Antipolis it was common cause that the vessel was derelict and 
had no owner. Res nullius is again well accounted for by the relationship principle. A 
relationship must be shown to have ended or not to have been present at all. 
The relationship of an erstwhile owner (in the form of the insurer by subrogation) to a 
wreck is discussed under the discussion of The Central America114 below. 
Sonnekus 115 finds that the courts are prepared to presume abandonment where 
shipwreck is concerned. The measure of abandonment is related to the loss of control 
and the unlikelihood of regaining control. There could, however, be a far more 
pragmatic reason for abandonment which Sonnekus has not included. A vessel in 
distress might have accrued considerable expense which exceeds the value of the 
vessel. While still foundering she might have been exposed to salvage or wreck 
removal or even those arising out of collisions or pollution caused by the vessel. These 
claims could far outstrip the value of the vessel and an owner with little if any 
connection with the Republic would have little interest in the now sunken vessel. 
4.1.3 Wild Animals 
The law governing shipwreck was shaped with guidance from that governing wild 
animals. 
113 see generally Van der Merwe par. 133 fn. 29 
114 Columbus -America Discovery v Atlantic Mutual Insurance 974 F. 2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992) 
11s op cit. 
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As a general proposition wild animals are considered res nullius and become the 
property of the person who captures them. 116 
Taming of an animal will render it owned property. Taming could be considered the 
ultimate example of establishing a relationship with the res. As to the need for 
publicity required to give notice it is pointed out that a tame animal is one which has a 
consuetudo revertandi, the habit of returning. This is to be preferred to the alternative 
of the animus revertandi, the intention of returning. The intention of a person is hard 
enough to gauge so how much more so an animal. 
Animals which escape are also considered res nullius. 117 This appears to stem from the 
difficulty in proving the tame nature of animals mingling with their wild counterparts. 
Again the need for some form of notice of the state of ownership is quite important. 
The Game Theft Act118 provides substantial abrogation of the acquisition of game. 
This Act is particularly important in that changes in technology and economics have 
made the common law unworkable. The need to keep pace is reflected in the 
definition section 
The Act provides in its definition section that game will include "all game kept or held 
for commercial or hunting· purposes ... ". The actual abrogation is provided for by 
section 2 titled "Ownership of game" The section provides that : 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or common law 
. (a) a person who keeps or holds game or on behalf of whom game is kept or held on 
land that is sufficiently enclosed as contemplated in subsection (2) or who keeps 
game in a pen or kraal or in or on a vehicle, shall not lose ownership of that if the 
game escapes from such enclosed land or such pen kraal or vehicle." 
The mischief at which the act seems to be airried was that part of the common law that 
would allow an animal which had been captured and then escaped to revert to a res 
116 Van der Merwe op. cit. par. 133 
117 V d Merwe and Rabie "Eiendom van Wilde Diere" THRHR 
118 105 of 1991 
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nullius. It does, however, take the abrogation a lot further. A wild animal on private 
land would remain a res nullius until its capture. This situation was obviously 
completely unworkable. A game farmer could have spent hundreds of thousands of 
Rands on the restocking of an area of land with all types of game. Should the game 
escape he would have no claim to that game since it would, at common law, have 
reverted to a res nullius. The requirement is at its loosest that the game should be on 
enclosed land. At its strongest Act allows ownership to be acquired by fencing in an 
area ofland and not by the usual method ofcapturing the animal. 
How is this to apply to the marine environment? The most important recognition that 
this Act makes is the shortcomings of dealing with marine resources. The Legislature 
had the insight to appreciate that some aspects of the common law are not appropriate 
in dealing with the acquisition of unowned property. One of the more important 
factors mentioned above is that the courts in developing the law of wreck had relied 
heavily on the jurisprudence surrounding wild animals. Ironically, only a few months 
after the Appellate Division's judgement in The Antipolis119 the legislature was to 
change the law extensively. The change involved a move away from the original . 
method but a more relaxed provision which could easily be described by Harriss' 
relationship with the res test 
4.1.4 Intra Commercium 
This aspect of wreck acquisition is a chance to consider our Roman Dutch traditions. 
From Roman times there was an awareness that some things are just beyond the range 
of private ownership. Some examples are obvious: the air is a good example simply 
from the point of view of practicality. Roman Dutch Law also recognised that class of 
things which was the property of the public and of particular communities. 
119 op cit. 
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4.1.4.1 Publicae120 And The Universitas. 121 
These are a class of things which are open to the public to enjoy. They would include 
parks, roads and other similar amenities. 122 The question is: Do museums become 
publicae? Surely they do fall into this category since they are similarly held in trust by 
the state for the general public. If this is the case then an historic wreck could also be 
considered to be in this class. The historic wreck lying within easy reach of sport 
divers it could easily be argued, resembles more a national park than a modem derelict 
wreck. This is supported by the type of restrictions governing its salvage and 
alienation described above. If this is the case then the salver of historic wreck never 
becomes a true owner and at qest has some kind of curatorial possession. The State is 
free to claim back its artefacts where it finds them. 
Many of our other notions as to what is amenable to private ownership would involve 
a cultural assessment. Interestingly enough there a certain amount of decorum shown 
to grave sites. This is a culturally informed notion which goes to the very heart of our 
relation ship with property. It is interesting to note that the NMA also offers 
protection to a certain class of graves. These are notably war graves. 123 This is a 
strong recognition that some things are so imbued with a cultural relationship that 
private ownership is not possible, even distasteful. Wrecks are very close to war 
graves since many of these casualties involved loss of life. Would salvers be 
comfortable robbing graves? 
The acquisition of historic wreck is a problem which requires a balancing of tensions. 
Some possible alternatives to the current position will be considered below. 
120 d 1 8 1 1 
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122 see generally Silberberg an Schoeman p.24 
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5. Comparison For Clarity - Other Jurisdictions 
The problem of the original acquisition of property and particularly of wreck is not a 
unique one. Other jurisdictions have sought to arrive at common sense and yet employ 
equitable solutions. In examining other approaches we shall see what they might offer 
us in South Africa. Some of these jurisdictions do have a preservationist approach to 
historic shipwreck. This is not a coincidence but rather a manifestation of concern 
which courts and legislatures are showing for the preservation of their historical 
heritage. 
5.1 The United Kingdom 
An important start in discussing the acquisition of wreck in other jurisdictions is the 
possibility that under section 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act. 124 this 
claim could have been considered a maritime claim and decided in terms of the English 
Law as it stood in 1983. 
5.1.1 Applicability In South Africa? 
It is possible that The Antipolis should have been decided in terms of English law and 
not South African Law. Booysen 125 argues that seeking to apply Roman Dutch 
principles is as appropriate as using the protection conferred on a holder in due course 
by the Law of Negotiable Instruments to a claim in a paternity suit. Booysen126 feels 
that the court and the various commentators have simply taken for granted that the law 
governing the occupatio of wild animals was the correct law to apply. He feels that 
the matter should be dealt with as one of Maritime Law. He sets his enquiry out quite 
concisely. 
124 105 of 1983 
125 1990 THRHR 595 "Die toepassing van die Wisselwet om Vaderskap te Bepaal en van die Romeins 
Hollands Reg op Berging" 
126 op cit p. 596 
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'Die vraag is of fl. persoon wat besig is met berging ongesteurd met sy berging mag 
voortgaan en of sy besit wat nodig vir die berging kan wees, beskerm saI wees."127 
Booysen seeks to answer the question with reference to the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act128 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act129 provides the choice of law for maritime 
matters. 130 In order to invoke the act it must be ascertained if the claim that is being 
dealt with is in fact a maritime claim. 131 The definition of a maritime claim is provided 
for by the Act. 132 It could be argued that the claim in The Antipolis133 was 
•~ claim for, or arising out of, or relating to- (a) the ownership of a ship.(b) the 
possession ... of a ship. "134 
This view is supported by Staniland 135 who argues that' the distinction between 
"wreck" and "ship" is enormously arbitrary. He poses the anomaly that ships are all 
potential wrecks and many a wreck could be refloated and would revert to being a 
ship. 136 
If this step of the enquiry is satisfied then it is appropriate to consider the second step. 
This is to see if the claim would have been cognisable by the Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty in South Africa in 1890. This is done with recourse to earlier statutes which 
bound the Courts of Admiralty across the commonwealth. The Admiralty act of 
1840137 provides in s IV : 
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'That the said Court of Admiralty shall have Jurisdiction to decide all Question as to 
the Title to or Ownership of any Ship or Vessel, or the proceeds thereof. . arising 
in any Cause of Possession, [or] Salvage ... " 
If a wreck may be regarded as a "ship or vessel", then this section should be wide 
enough to include a dispute as to wreck or ownership of wreck. This is view is shared 
by Staniland138 who points out that the wording of s 7(2) (a) is peremptory and the 
court was obliged to sit as a court of Admiralty. 
The appropriate cause of action could be an action in rem against the salved property. 
An action in rem is available where the claimant has a maritime lien over the property 
or the owner of the property would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam 
in respect of the cause of action concerned. 139 Personal liability could readily be ruled 
out since we are dealing with an ostensibly ownerless thing. (The curatorial nature of 
the States rights could be ignored for the sake of the argument.) A maritime lien 
ordinarily requires an underlying personal liability on the part of the owner of the 
maritime lien 
This should serve to exclude salvage from derelict. But Thomas 140 opmes that a 
maritime lien is available in the case of salvage of derelict. 141 Thomas points out that 
'The salvage maritime lien accrues independently of any voluntarily assumed 
obligation on the part of the owner of the imperilled res to pay a salvage award." 
Liens on derelict wreck are in fact specifically provided for as an example of the 
readiness with which salvage liens attach. Thomas142 writes that 
•~ maritime lien accrues when salvage service is rendered in the absence and 
without the knowledge of the res owner, as, for example when salvage services are 
rendered to a derelict." 
138 op cit p. 595 
139 AJRA op cit at s 3(4) 
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Staniland143 rejects this and finds that such in rem proceedings are unavailable. 
Staniland does not provide any authority for this saying rather that "it is generally 
thought that there must be personal liability"144 
A possible reason why the action in rem might not be available .is that Thomas could 
assume the Crown's right in wreck as a type of surrogate owner145 This can easily be 
dismissed since the Crown's droit extended only to wrecks within its dominion146. If it 
could be shown that the derelict was brought in from outside the dominion then the 
salvor has the strongest possible right. It is quite conceivable that this would extend to 
100% of the fund established by the sale of the salved derelict. 
With this stage of the convolutions of s 6 complete, it is now left to determine the law 
of England as at 1983. Halsbury147 leaves us in no doubt that the decision in The 
Tubantia was as good law in 1983 as it is in 1996. 
5.1.2 The Tubantia 148 
One of the strongest sources of authority on ownership or possession of wreck was to 
come from The Tubantia. A discussion of the facts will show how strongly analogous 
they were to those of The Antipolis. 
The plaintiffs were salvors working on the wreck of the Dutch steamship Tubantia. 
Work began in 1922 with the salvors attempting to raise her. When it was ruled that 
this would not be feasible it was decided that the cargo was to be removed piecemeal 
through an incision in the hull. Salvage operations were abandoned due to the rigours 
of the weather in November 1922 but started again in April 1923. It was soon after 
143 op cit p. 596 
144 op cit. , 
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this date that the defendant salvage company The British Semper Paratus Salvage 
Company sent its tug the Semper Paratus out to the site of the wreck. This ship 
caused considerable disturbance on the wreck. The crew tried to moor a motor launch 
on the plaintiff's buoys and sent down sounding lines which tangled in the plaintiff's 
lines. 
The court expressed the problem very crisply. 
'What is really to be decide is whether in respect of the Tubantia and her cargo any 
rights of the plaintiff have been infringed by the defendants and if so what are the 
appropriate remedies."149 
The right in question was that of the salvor in respect of salved property. This right 
was described as being "as well known to the law as any right of the salvor". 150 The 
salvor' s right to be in possession could be over a variety of things and included derelict 
wreck. 
In establishing whether possession had in fact taken place the court went to great pains 
to show the relationship that had been created between the plaintiff salvors and the 
wreck. It was pointed out that the operations were in fact "discontinuous" 151 The 
Court found that the extent of the plaintiffs actions "... must be stated in some 
detail" 152 
'The plaintiffs by employing during two seasons, various vessels suitable for salvage 
work with competent crews ascertained and marked out the area occupied by The 
Tubantia and by means of buoys properly moored they were able to ... keep in 
. position at and above the wreck, craft from which work could be carried on upon the 
hull and in the holds. They established and were using, various buoyed moorings by 
which they had direct access to the deck at various points. They cut a hole in the 
ship's side ... which gave them access to no. 4 hold."153 
149 op cit p. 86. 
150 op cit p. 87 
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The court found that by means of these and other apparati, they were able to work on 
the wreck and the cargo "when the weather and the state of the tide permitted". 154 
After analysing the state of work on the wreck the court posed a number of questions. 
chief among them must be " ... what are the kinds of physical control and use of which 
the things are capable?"155 The court found that had the original owners in 1916 have 
been in a similar position in relation to the wreck, they would have been in possession. 
The Court also had the foresight to seek guidance from assessors on the more 
technical matters involved. These were the Elder Brethren of Trinity House. It was 
their recommendation that possession of a wreck could be achieved by mooring a 
single buoy. 156 They also made clear to the court the difficulties attendant on 
performing salvage operations of this type. They advised the court that the plaintiffs 
had acted as one would expect a prudent owner to act. 157 The court expressed its 
indebtedness to the Elder Brethren and acknowledged the role that they had to play in 
the formation of the judgement. 
What of the delays caused by bad weather, or the fact that there were only a few divers 
working at any one time? Should they not have had an impact on the possession of the 
wreck? The answer was a resounding no. The court found that do this would 
discourage salvage performed "by bold and costly work" 158 
With possession having been established it was left to the court to see whether a 
trespass had in fact been committed. This too was answered in the positive. The 
manner in which the defendant had approached the wreck and sent sounding lines and 
grapnels down, had been such a source of danger that the plaintiff's divers were 
prevented from working normally but had in the end to work in shifts with one 
watching for the threatening activities of the defendants servants. The description of 
how the plaintiff had approached the salvage work of the defendants could be applied 
154 opcit 
155 op cit p. 89 
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to the defendant in The Antipolis. He had "deemed himself entitled to entitled to 
thrust in upon the plaintiffs ... to establish himself in concurrent occupation."159 
The application of English Law is not as simple as it may seem. The Law is closely 
associated with the administrative bodies in place· to deal with wreck. All wreck 
brought ashore must be reported to .a Receiver of Wrecks. 160 The Receiver will then 
publicise the find. The owner will have a year to come forward and claim the wreck. 161 
The Owner may only have his property back if he pays a salvage award to the person 
who has brought it ashore. 162 The question must then be posed what if no one comes 
forward? The answer is interesting, it is that ownerless or derelict wrecks are actually 
not ownerless at all under UK law. This paradox is created by a very ancient fiction 
which finds that wreck brought ashore in the UK are the property of the Crown. 163 The 
Crown will pay a salvage award to the salvors and the balance is paid to the Crown. 164 
How is this to be reconciled with South African Law? South Africa has provision for 
the rights of the State to derelict. This will incorporate the Law of Salvage into claims 
arising out of derelict wreck. The complete body of Salvage Law is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to say that it is robust and dynamic and may provide solutions 
to some of the complexities posed by The Antipolis. 
A useful parallel is provided by a the judgement in The Central America in the USA as 
will be shown below. 
5.2 Whales and W reeks 
Whales and wreck enjoy not dissimilar status in English Law. Both were held to 
belong to the Crown when they were brought ashore. A salvage award was payable to 
159 op cit 91 
160 s 518 of the MSA of 1894 
161 s 521(1) op cit. 
162 op cit 
163 Kennedy op cit at par. 1393 p. 561 citing s 523 of the MSA of 1894 
164 MSA 1894 s 526 
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anyone who brought a "royal fish" ashore. 165 A royal fish included "grampuses, 
porpoises, dolphins, riggs and grasps" 166 Interestingly enough there was held to be a 
special relationship between the Sovereign and Whales. This once again demonstrates 
the close tie between economic importance and the development of the recognition of 
a relationship. It is difficult for us living in the age of the synthetic manufacture of 
many of our consumer requirements to imagine the enormous value of the whale. 
Whales represented a source of pure oils for fuel, lubrication and other purposes. 
5.2.1 Aberdeen Arctic Company v Sutter167 
This is a particularly interesting case in examining the law of the acquisition of marine 
resources. The court was faced with a decision between the application of the 
aboriginal law of the local Inuit168 or that common to those involved in Western whale 
fishing. An Inuit had been contracted to a whaler out of Aberdeen, the Alibi. The 
Alibi sighted a whale and sent out an Inuit in a boat to harpoon the whale. The whale 
was harpooned and a "drog" attached to the line.(A drog is a sealskin float). The 
defendants vessel intercepted the whale and was able to harpoon it and subsequently 
boat it. The owners of the Alibi sought an order of a right in property declaring the 
whale to be theirs. This was granted on appeal by the Scottish court of first division 
and the defendants appealed to the House of Lords. 
The problem which faced the court was not merely one of applying customary law but 
also which customary law was to apply. The plaintiffs alleged that the proper law 
governing disputes of this nature was Inuit customary law since it was beyond the area . 
of the Northern Whale Fishery and the indigenous method for the acquisition of marine 
resources was to apply. The court found that this was not the case and applied the 
Western model of acquisition. This was described as "The rule of fast and loose". 
This implies that ownership was acquired at the stage where the whale had been 
harpooned and the harpoon line had been fastened to a boat. It was common practice 
165 Kennedy op cit par. 278 p. 561 
166 The Lord Warden and Admiral of the Cinque Ports v H.M in his office of Admiralty etc. (In the 
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that a whale which had been subdued and tied up to the ice would not be considered to 
belong to its captors. This rule is an interesting one. It would seem to be quite useful. 
If a whale has been harpooned and is tied to a boat, those aboard the boat will be left 
with little doubt as to whether it is or is not in the process of being subdued. The 
actual act of subduing a whale was referred to as a "Nantucket sled ride" because of 
the speed with which the light craft would be towed. Seeing a whale tied up fulfils a 
very useful publicity factor which might be absent where just a drog is used. 
This case could have been subjected to the relationship with the res test. Who was at 
the time in a closer relationship with the res, the Inuit with drog attached or the whaler 
about to harpoon the whale? Again the modified Harris' test described above under the 
discussion of Van Breda v Jacobs169 could be used to resolve the conflict. The 
question should be "Who would be considered to be in a closer relationship to the res 
by the those in the area?" The relationship which was actually recognised was that 
reflected in the adage "fast or loose". Was the Alibi exercising the greatest possible 
control over the res? Perhaps not, it is possible that the making fast of the whale was 
the real commencement of the relationship of which the whaler Alibi was herself 
capable? 
The law governing whaling is not that remote from that of wreck and the case of 
Langley v Miller170 is often cited in dealing with the acquisition of wreck. Particularly 
the judgement of Burger Jin The Antipolis. 171 The judgement of the court was that the 
party who had rendered assistance was entitled to a half share in the value· of the 
whale. The dissenting judgement of Menzies J. found that the defendant had acquired 
ownership of the res by so mortally wounding the whale that it was no "longer able to 
keep the sea". 172 It was Menzies J. 's attention to what the commercial realities of the 
industries are which is so impressive. The defendant had shown himself to be in the 
greatest possible state of physical control. The evidence produced was rather macabre 
and took the form of the captain of a whaler and a witness who had worked in the 
169 op cit. 
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industry and was able to describe the extent of the whale's injuries. 173 Based on their 
assessment of the degree of control usually encountered they were able to recommend 
to the court that the requisite degree of control had been established. 174 
5.2.2 Statutory Provisions For Historic Shipwreck In The UK 
Historic wrecks are still dealt with under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. The Act 
provides for a receiver of wreck to deal with any wreck brought into the UK. The 
provision was brought in not to deal with historic wrecks but to regulate the handling 
and bringing ashore of wreck and discourage the practice of wrecking. The 1894 Act 
addresses particularly the problems of "riotous and tumultuous" assemblies of people 
on the site of a wreck175and the of wrecks being "secreted" away. 176 Dromgoole177 
deals with the way in which the responsibility for dealing with hist.oric wreck was _ 
moved away from the Department of Transport to the Department of the Environment 
(DOE). The DOE portfolio is also concerned with land based antiquities. The move 
was welcomed by those involved in the preservation of historic wreck but it still left 
much concern. The actual structure had changed little in that the receiver of wreck 
was still the proper authority for bringing wreck into the UK. This system had fallen 
into disuse. Dromgoole points to the negligible amount of wreck reported set against 
the high number of sport divers operating along the coastline of the UK. 
There are provisions for the protection of historic wrecks which are in many ways 
similar to those in South Africa. The Protection of Wrecks Act of 1973 allows for the 
declaration of wreck sites "on account of the historical, archaeological, or artistic 
importance of the vessel or any objects contained or formerly contained within it." 
Acquisition of historic wreck can only take place in accordance with a licence now 
issued by the DOE. What is interesting is the amount of technical expertise that goes 
into the issuing of licences and the declaration of wreck sites. The DOE is advised by 
173 The captain of a whaler had said that he had never known a whale that had been so badly wounded 
to escape in good weather. p. 587 
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"Advisory Committee on Historic Wreck Sites." Dromgoole describes this as being a 
"non-governmental public body"178 This would probably allow for those in the 
curatorial and salvage sides of wreck to be able to make a positive contribution to 
policy formation. The DOE is further advised by the "Archaeological Diving Unit". 
This was established in 1986 to provide the authorities with what Dromgoole179 
describes as "full time archaeological expertise". This points to a fairly well funded 
authority something which apparently the South African NMC is not. 
Dromgoole180does not call for the scrapping of the Receiver system rather he proposes 
that instead of relying mainly on Customs and Excise officers, the museum or other 
curatorial authorities could be included in the Receiver system. 
In South Africa there could be a lot more enforcement of the laws governing the 
acquisition of historic wreck. The ·appropriate authorities are no doubt under 
considerable pressure to enforce Sea Fisheries legislation and antiquities are secondary. 
There only thirteen Cape Provincial Administration officers to patrol the coastline from 
The Strand to Gansbaai. 181 To expect an efficient enforcement of NMC conditions or 
even the wholesale removal of artefacts with such limited resources is unrealistic. 
5.3 Australia 
In 1992 the Australian High Court produced an analysis of unowned property which 
resounded in politics, sociology and international relations. The impetus came in the 
unassuming guise of one Eddie Mabe. Mabe was a member of the Merriam people 
from the Murray Islands which lie off Australia's North East coast. The declaration 
sought by Mabo was that the Meriam people's right to the Murray Islands "as owners 
as possessors, as occupiers or as persons entitled to use and enjoy the said islands"182 
be protected. 
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Justice Brennan in his consideration of the ownership of the Islands points out the 
problems attendant on applying long antiquated notions of property relations. 183 The 
Crown had based its claim to title on the fact that the territory had not yet been 
claimed. "The Crown's sovereignty over a territory was acquired under an enlarged 
notion of terra nullius''. 184 To convey a full appreciation of the Crown's denigration of 
original Aboriginal title Brennan J. aptly quotes from a "Select Committee on 
Aborigines" of 1837. This proposes that Aboriginals are so "Barbarous" and "so 
entirely destitute of the rudest forms of civil polity that their claims as sovereigns or 
proprietors of the soil, have been utterly disregarded". 185 A fundamental problem lies in 
the fact that the very basis of the Crown claim was couched in such a " ... denigration of 
indigenous inhabitants, their social organisation and customs"186 
Brennan J. in his judgement points out that for a valid claim of occupatio of a territory 
it must above all be unowned. In support of this notion the court relied to a fair degree 
on the judgement of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Western Sahara. 187The I.CJ was faced with the problem that its notions of property 
could not deal with those propounded by counsel for the indigenous people. The facts 
were closely analogous. In the Western Sahara Case the question centred on whether 
nomadic "tribesmen" could constitute occupation of an area. The I.CJ found that it 
did and that any succession in title would be derivative and not original. 188 
Interestingly enough it was the reasons given by the Crown as to why the land was 
unoccupied that turned out to be their biggest weakness. The Crown had contended 
that the land was not occupied by the early inhabitants because they had a largely 
nomadic existence. The Court points out that this is a sign of being in an intensely 
close relationship with the land. Aboriginal peoples lived in a precarious position. 
They depended on the land for their very survival. A nomadic people move off in 
search of food when they have exhausted available supplies. Who could be said to be 
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in a closer relationship with the res than those who depend on the res for their very 
survival? 
The Mabo judgement represents a profound recognition of a relationship with a res. 
What the court could have done was to apply the Harris test in its purest form and ask 
whether the Meriam people were in a sufficiently close relationship at the relevant 
time. 
5.3.1 Historic Shipwreck In Australia 
Historic Shipwreck is governed by the Historic Shipwrecks Act of 1976. The Act 
empowers the minister to promulgate in the gazette that a shipwreck site is an 
historical site. The Act seems to resemble South African law quite closely as well. 
There _are some exceptions. There are no minimum ages for a wreck to be historic. 
The declaration of a wreck site is at the discretion of the Minister. 189 The act extends 
Australia's jurisdiction over wrecks to those on the continental shelf 190 The zone of 
protection could include areas around a wreck. 
What is interesting is the way the res nul/ius aspect of historic wrecks has been 
modified where Dutch ships are concerned. In the schedule to the Act is the 
agreement between · the Australian Government and that of Holland. The Dutch 
government purports to be successors in title to the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie) or Dutch East India Company. The Dutch Government confers title in 
ships, which belonged to the VOC and were wrecked off Australia, to the Australian 
Government. There were no doubt many such vessels blown off course en route to or 
from the Dutch East Indies. The question must then be what is the state of Sl;ICh an 
attitude to wreck in South African waters. Why has such an agreement not been 
entered into by South Africa? Is it still possible to assert ownership after more than 
300 years? There is no reason why the wrecks should not be subject to such claims. 
An intention to abandon may only be apparent where there was an opportunity to 
abandon. 
189 s 5(1) 
190 s 6(1) 
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If the VOC had at no stage intended to abandon its vessels, and had continually 
asserted its rights then their ownership might persist. 
5.4 The United States 
The law governing ownership of (purportedly) abandoned shipwreck was covered in 
The Central America. 191 It is a case of many and varied twists and turns and sheds 
much light o~ the topic. The Central America went down in 1857 en route from the 
Panama Isthmus to New York. She had the honour of being the main means of 
transporting gold from the Gold Fields of California to banks in New York. According 
to the court it was a time of economic downturn and there was a great interest in 
seeing as much money converted into gold and safely ensconced in a bank. 192 The gold 
was estimated to have an astronomical value of $1,6 million in 1857. There were no 
exact records of the place of her sinking. She was insured by a number of underwriters 
who settled the claims relating to the loss. On settlement, rights in the vessel and 
cargo passed to the underwriters by subrogation. 193 The matter was left at that until the 
Central America was discovered and a scramble for the great wealth in gold specie 
ensued. 
The discoverers were the Columbus America Discovery Gro_up a consortium of 
investors and treasure hunters. The initiative for the search for the Central America 
came from a certain Thompson, who had researched the prospects for such a mission 
as far back as the 1970' s. 194 He was able to secure the financial backing of Grimm and 
John. There ensued a protracted search and eventually the site of the wreck was . 
found. 
191 Columbus -America Discovery v Atlantic Mutual Insurance 974 F. 2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992) 
192 op cit p. 457 
193 see generally p.456 
194 op cit 457 
46 
r 
The Discovery Group sought an injunction from the District Court declaring them to 
be the owner of the vessel and its cargo. This was contested by the underwriters who 
asserted their right of ownership through subrogation and who denied that they had at 
any stage abandoned their interest in the wreck. The District Court divided the trial 
into two enquiries: Firstly could the law of Finds be applied? (For this, abandonment 
was required.) Secondly if the Discovery group were not owners, did they have a claim 
for Salvage against the owners? The underwriters failed at step one. The court found 
that they had in fact abandoned their interest and awarded ownership of all the gold to 
the discovery Group. Against this the underwriters appealed. 195 
It is not necessary for present purposes to go into the claim made by the intervenors to 
the trial. Suffice it to say that there had been an agreement entered for the assistance 
of expert oceanographers and a rival salvage group who claimed to be the initial 
finders of the wreck and that the claim put forward by the Central America Group was 
in fact fictitious. This was dismissed out of hand by the District Court and the court of 
Appeals. 
The 4th circuit court of appeals considered the a quo findings and reversed them. In 
their judgement the court expressed their disapproval of the law of Finds as apposed to 
that of Salvage. The Law of Finds, it felt was not suited to activities of this type. 
The court felt that the law of finds relies on an assertion of possession to assert title. 
This coupled with other elements has the effect of encouraging certain types of 
behaviour and has certain types of results. A particular remark is readily applicable to 
the circumstances in The Antipolis. 
'The would be finder's longing to acquire is exacerbated by,the by the prospect of 
being found to have failed to establish title. If either intent or possession is found 
lacking, the would be finder receives nothing, neither effort alone nor acquisition 
unaccompanied by the required intent is rewarded." 196 
195 
Op cit. p. 453 
196 op cit p. 460 
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The court went on lo say that Finds encourages work to take place in secret. 
In sharp contrast to this was the law of Salvage. It's "aims assumptions and rules" 
were said to be "more consonant with the needs of maritime activity.". 197 An 
important trump card for Salvage was the fact that it does not operate on an all or 
nothing basis. A salver who had offered some services but not all was still entitled to a 
quantum meruit. 
The court also put forward the idea that property lost at sea was taken away 
involuntarily and that abandonment would be difficult to prove. 198 
As to the general requirements of abandonment in US Law, the court would be 
reluctant to interpret abandonment simply with reference to "lapse of time and 
nonuser". 199 A more concrete undertaking is required. A " ... strong act" such as "the 
owners express declaration abandoning title" is sought. 200This could not be said to 
have occurred in the case of the Central America. 
The court looked at the dealings between the Discovery Group and the Undenvriters. 
The Discovery group made extensive use of the Underwriters library. They even went 
so far as to write to the underwriters to assess the possibility of acquiring their claim to 
the wreck. 201 At no stage did the underwriters consent to such a claim. They had 
attempted salvage soon after the loss but the necessary technology was not yet 
available. They reiterated their dealings with the vessel in a 1967 publication 
recounting the history of the Atlantic Mutual. 
Once the matter had been remanded to the district court to be decided as a salvage 
award the 1 ower courts made a salvage award of 90% in favour of Columbus America. 
The Underwriters appealed against this and it again fell to the appellate court to 
197 op cit p. 461 
198 op cit. 
199 op cit p. 461 
200 op cit. 
201 op cit p. 467 
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consider the Salvage award. 
202 
The court acknowledging the Underwriters ownership 
in the earlier decision analysed the factors that affect salvage awards and affirmed the 
lower courts ruling. 203 
The court applied the principles laid down in The Blackwall. 204 The labour expended 
by the salvor was the first element. This the court showed to have been extensive. 
The vessel spent 487 days at sea working in 12 hour shifts and surveying an area the 
size of the state of Rhode Island. The court noted that the usual duration for searches 
of this kind would be a matter of days or weeks. 
The salver's promptitude and skill were also considered. The fact that the group had 
been able to assemble experts in the fields of "science, archaeology, history, maritime 
and marketing"205 obviously counted for much. This was also viewed against the fact 
that on hearing that a machine did not yet exist which was capable of performing the 
search required, the Group saw to it that such a device was designed and built. The 
value of the property employed by the salvor also featured quite prominentl/06 The 
court pointed out that capital investment in vessels exceeded $6 million. The court 
was not aware of a similar salvage operation which had used equipment of that value. 
The degree of danger faced by the property was possibly overstated by the court. 
They felt that the property was in fact in extreme danger The court felt that until it was 
retrieved it was to be viewed as being in danger. The value of the property was 
obviously to play a vital role. "The haul" was to be "one of the largest in history" 
and obviously this entitled the salvors to a greater share. 
The last factor that the court considered was an innovative approach to an old 
problem. The degree of preservation of historical and archaeological value of the 
wreck was considered as a factor. This is one solution to the vexed problem of 
reconciling salvage to historical preservation. The salvor is given an incentive to 
conduct historical analysis and leave as much of the wreck undisturbed as possible. It 
202 Columbus America V Atlantic .\futual Insurance 56 F. 3d 556 (4th cir. 1995) 
203 op cit p. 558 
204 op cit p. 571 
20s op cit. 
206 op cit p. 572 
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also added in considering miscellaneous considerations that the policy of encouraging 
salvors should be supported. 
5.4.1 The USA Abandoned Shipwreck Act Of 1987 
Sweeping changes were made to the US law regulating historic shipwreck when The 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act was signed into force in 1988. The USA asserts title to all 
abandoned shipwrecks in its territorial waters. 207 Owen208 points out that a 
"shipwreck" includes "a vessel its cargo and other contents." The Act applies only to 
those wrecks "embedded"209in the sea floor. The use of the word "embedded" is 
itself not coincidental. It is drawn from developments in the American Common Law 
of finds. The Meaning assigned to embedded is also drawn from jurisprudence on the 
matter. Owen210 points to the case of Chance v Certain Artefacts. 211 Here the ( a quo) 
court referred to a vessel "finnly affixed such that the use of tools of excavation is 
required to gain access to the shipwreck and ... any part thereof'. 
The notion of the "embedded" wreck should be explored by the National Monuments 
Council. It is not unrealistic to argue that historic wrecks already accede to the state 
by the law of accession and inaedificatio212. The Sea Shore Act213 confers title to the 
sea, sea shore and sea bed on the State via the President. This could make the 
President owner of all artefacts and antiquities that have accede to his land. The 
extensive abrogation of the public nature of the sea, sea bed and shore was effected 
with the intention of defeating objections to beach Apartheid. Now it could be used for 
the protection of South Afiica' s cultural heritage. 
The most striking aspect of the American legislation is the degree to which it abrogates 
the common Law of Finds. 214 It states quite specifically that the Law of Salvage and 
201 s 6(a) 
208 JML&C vol.19 499 p. 500 
209 s 6(a)(l)(2) 
210 op cit p. 505 
211 606 F Supp. 801, 
212 see generally Vd Merwe Law of Things par 142 
213 21 of 1935 s2 
214 s 7(a) 
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Finds will not apply. The inclusion of the two is to overcome an attempt by salvage 
interests to weaken the effect of the act. Owen215 points out that it had become 
common in salvage cases to plead the two rights to the property in the alternative. 
The question of compensation for the salvor is left to the individual state to decide. 
Owen
216
enumerates some states which have such law~ in place but others he says will 
be "writing on a blank slate"217 To understand the Federal Government's delegation of 
jurisdiction for historic wreck to states which had previously had no interest in it, one 
must look to the origin of the Act. 
5.4.1.1 The Genesis Of The Abandoned Shipwreck Act Of 1987 
The evolution of the Act is helpful t? understand the Act's devolution of authority to 
states which might not have an established jurisprudence. The late 1980' s were a time 
of growing concern for state autonomy. Those lobbying for a particular law would do 
well to include a state autonomy provision to bring a substantial number of supporters 
into their camp. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 is not the only Maritime Law 
provision to have such a history. The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has a similar 
origin. In determining an oil polluter's liability no cap was put on the amount that 
could be claimed by an individual state. This idea of an unfettered state hand appealed 
greatly to those arguing in favour of the greatest state autonomy possible. 
5.4.2 Aboriginal Fishery Rights 
There could be few stronger examples of a court's protection of a relationship between 
people and their marine resources than that given to the American Aboriginal fishery. 
There has been increasing acceptance of aboriginal rights to fisheries. A strong 
recognition of the close relationship that American Aboriginal people enjoyed with the 
215 op cit p. 510 
216 op cit p. 512 
211 op cit. 
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resource has developed. Bentley
218 
describes how the harvest was an essential source 
of social cohesion. The relationship is described as being so close that "fish were 
... not much less important than the atmosphere they breathed"219 
There was a strong cultural role played by the salmon fishery. The harvest time was an 
opportunity to give expression to the individual's place within a group. The whole 
community would be assigned tasks from the oldest to the youngest so that no one 
person could say that they were the harvester or that that the group was beholden to 
them for their survival. This is not the case with all indigenous harvesting and those 
areas where the capture is the sole domain of able bodied men. 
What Bentley220 points to is the ability to acquire ownership of the fish through 
ownership of a fishing site. Sites were apportioned to various families. These sites 
were located on strategically placed headlands where migratory fish are presumably be 
bottlenecked. (South African equivalents could probably be found in Rooikrantz at 
Cape Point and Robbeberg in the Eastern Cape) Ownership of these sites "ensured 
ownership of the fish that returned"221 This notion dovetails very comfortably with the 
decision in Van Breda. The enquiry in Harriss' terms above would also be sound. 
Where quota applications were concerned the court was forced to give effect to 
treaties which had accorded rights to the Native Americans. It was these early treaties 
which had originally recognised the close relationship with the resource. 
5.5 The Swiss Civil Code 
It might seem strange that a discussion of the law of the acquisition of shipwreck 
should include a reference to the law of a landlocked country. The Swiss have, 
however, a useful provision relating to antiquities. The code provides for occupatio 
with the usual formula provided in paragraph 718 
218 American Indian Law Review vol 17 1992 
219 United States v Winans 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) Cited by Bentley op cit. 
no op cit. 
221 op cit. 
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•~y person who talces possession of a chattel that has no owner with the intention 
of becoming owner of it acquires the ownership of it." 
This paragraph is by no means remarkable and is not worthy of much further comment. 
It is the modification of this formula where antiquities 1s concerned which is 
interesting. Paragraph 724 of the Code provides that 
'Where natural curiosities or antiquities are found which have no owner and are of 
considerable scientific value, they become the property of the Canton in whose 
borders they are found." 
This would imply that all cultural property would accrue automatically to the State. . 
No mention is made of compensation in this provision and, indeed none should be 
implied. The preceding provision of the ·code deals with treasure trove and the 
possibility of compensation for the finder. An equitable division is allowed for between 
the finder and the person in whose land the treasure was secreted. This is excluded 
expressly where the treasure falls within the parameters of the antiquities provision. 
Were a provision of this sort incorporated into South African Law I am sure it would 
be well received by the National Monuments Council. 
6. Concluding Notes And Suggestions 
In considering what is to be distilled from the above considerations of local and other 
jurisdictions, one of the strongest recommendations would be the application of the 
relationship test to assess if acquisition has taken place. Another consideration that the 
law governing the acquisition of derelict shipwreck is not that of South Africa but 
rather that of England 
As shown above many jurisdictions have achieved some clarity in the law governing 
shipwreck through a close analysis by the courts. In the case of the US the court was 
able to bring the law of Salvage to bear. This would appear to be a far more 
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1 appropriate body of law to cope with the problems which can reasonably be expected 
to arise. 
A considerable dilemma in this area is the fact that the law on which the acquisition of. 
shipwreck was founded was that regulating the acquisition of wild animals. This area 
of law was, however, seen extensive abrogated by parliament in recognition of the fact 
that it was inadequate in its application to modem commercial realities. From this it 
must flow that if the law of wild animals was unrealistic, if not altogether unhelpful, 
then how much more so would it be when extended to shipwreck by analogy. 
It must be asked if, following other jurisdictions and following the direction offered in 
Roman Dutch Law,222 whether the Law of Salvage would not be better suited to the 
acquisition of shipwreck. 
6.1 Possible Modifications To The Law Of Historic Shipwreck 
6.1.1 The Importance Of Removing The Res Nullius Aspect Of Historic Wreck. 
This is premised on the idea that historical wreck is, as far as the salver is concerned, 
the same as working for an ordinary commercial client in refloating a craft that sank 
recently or retrieving an anchor that has broken its chain. The state is according to 
Grotius the owner of "shipwreck . . . found in the sea and fished out of it. "223 All that 
is owed to the salvor is reasonable compensation. Salvage compensation is closely 
linked to the nature of the res which is salved. Where historic shipwreck is concerned 
the real salving of the vessel is the preservation of its archaeological value. 
The compensation that historical wreck salvers could expect would not necessarily to 
be calculated against the value of the thing which is to be salvaged. Assuming that it is 
to be calculated on that basis it is not on a scale anything resembling 50%. A salvage 
award ofless than ten percent is not unusual. 
222 Grotius p. 2.4.36 
r 223 Grotius p. 2.4.36 
l 
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6.1.2 The Importance Of Modifying The Law Of Salvage From Historic Wreck 
Salvage and archaeology often do not mix. The two disciplines have evolved different 
priorities. For the archaeologist the wreck is a source of irreplaceable information. 
The position of relatively worthless debris could be as important as gold specie. 
Brice
224 
feels that a historic wreck falls into a class of property amenable to salvage 
because it is "immobilised". This does not take into account another requirement of 
salvage it is concerned with maritime property in distress. A potential salyage 
operation is often a far greater peril than allowing the wreck to remain undisturbed. 
What is required is a need to see a value in things beyond the price offered by a willing 
seller and a willing buyer. Archaeological and cultural values should be allowed to 
trump market values. Some property is so imbued with ~ertain features that it is 
warranted special protection, that is why it is a National Monument. 
6.1.3 How Are Salvors To Be Encouraged? 
It is one thing to say that salvers should not be entitled to keep what they find and 
another to realise that the NMC's opportunities for the study of antiquities would be 
enormously reduced if salvers are not encouraged. Would not a preferable system be 
one whereby accurate archaeology could be sold and not just trinkets brought up and 
polished. A salvor which conducts the operation in the most careful scientific way 
might be able to "rent" it to other countries museums which will be saved the trouble 
of having to go through the process themselves. The "rental" should take place as 
soon as the wreck is discovered. The opportunity to work on it should be auctioned to 
an institution which would qualify under the National Monuments Act. All artefacts 
could go on a loan of a specified period to the institution and all intellectual property 
rights in the discovery should remain in the institution for that period. The NMC is 
empowered to do so by virtue of the sweeping powers conferred on it by their enabling 
224 "Salvage and Underwater cultural Heritage" Marine Policy vol. 20 no. 4 p 337- 342 
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legislation. It is hard to think how the scheme outlined above would not fall within the 
parameters of s5(1)(e) of the act where the 
'Council shall . . . have the power to purchase, or otherwise acquire hold. let, hire 
receive in trust · or otherwise alienate, or hypothecate, burden with a servitude or 
otherwise confer any real right in any property movable or immovable" 
The money could go to the salvors at market rates, the balance could go to the NMC 
into a particular fund reserved for shipwreck research and not into the general pool of 
the state coffers 
6.1.4 Statutory Modifications 
It was not the intention·of this paper to offer concrete solutions or statutory formulae. 
It was simply an attempt to show some of the difficulties that beset our law and the 
way that other jurisdictions have chosen to deal with these issues. The Wreck and 
Salvage Bill has yet to be passed. · It is an ideal vehicle for some of the suggestions 
made above to be given effect. The NMC could also benefit from some modification 
to its empowering legislation. 
The Law of Salvage is so much more suited to the facts of The Antipolis and similar 
situations. It is dynamic and vital and is an area of law which has demonstrated a 
remarkably rapid response to the changing economic concerns which affect the 
industry from the change of sail to steam and the growing environmental threat of oil 
pollution. It would be a pity if it were not allowed to grow and develop to include the 
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